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Bullies and Beakers: How Large Universities are 
Squashing Research Competition and the Contractual 
Remedies to Solve It 
Jonathan Fort1 
INTRODUCTION 
The health sciences and biotechnology are booming research 
sectors.
2
 Due to the highly technical nature of this research, 
universities are in a unique position to aid private industry and seek 
cures and remedies for public health issues.
3
  
As in the private sector, competition among research universities 
for funding and prestige is fierce.
4
 Though this competition appears 
to stimulate innovative research, this competition also leads to a 
consolidation of innovative research among the well-funded and elite 
universities.
5
  
 
 1. Jonathan Fort, J.D. Candidate Class of 2017.  
 2. Bradley J. Fikes & Gary Robbins, USC Siphons Away Most of Alzheimer's Program, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2015) [hereinafter USC Siphons], 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/aug/29/ucsd-usc-alzheimers-aisen-
cooperative-study/; Bradley J. Fikes & Gary Robbins, USC Eyes Big Presence in San Diego, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter USC Eyes], http://www.sandiegounion 
tribune.com/news/2015/jul/ 16/usc-ucsd-expand/.  
 3. PETER DALY, THE BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS 51 (1985) (“Biotechnology emerged, 
therefore, as a direct result of technology transfer from the universities which originally were 
the only places where the expertise existed”); see Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of 
Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1951.  
 4. See Daniel J. Howard & Frank N. Laird, The New Normal in Funding University 
Science, Vol. XXX Issue 1, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. (2013), http://issues.org/30-1/the-new-
normal-in-funding-university-science/ (“Government funding for academic research will remain 
limited, and competition for grants will remain high”); see, e.g., USC Eyes, supra note 2 (USC 
previously attempted to acquire or merge with The Scripps Institute in La Jolla. Scripps faculty 
and researchers pressured Scripps’s board to terminate the deal. “The setback didn’t scare off 
USC, which has been trying hard for the past six years to raise its modest standing in the life 
sciences.”).  
 5. See Howard & Laird, supra note 4 (“Since the founding of NSF in 1950, the research 
enterprise on university campuses in the United States has grown rapidly . . . . The competitive 
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Well-funded universities have the power to lure researchers away 
from small research universities by offering them lucrative 
compensation packages and other intangible benefits.
6
 In exchange, 
the large university usually gains access and control over the 
researcher’s projects and any private funding for those projects.7 
Small research universities simply cannot compete with many of the 
offers made by well-funded research universities.
8
 When researchers 
leave the small research university, they often leave the university in 
a poor position to recover from their exit.
9
 I contend that small 
research universities are not properly incentivized to begin innovative 
research because their researchers, programs, and funds may be 
poached by a well-funded university. My Note identifies this 
disincentive and argues that it is entirely inconsistent with, and 
damaging to, the overall search for cures and remedies to diseases 
and other public health problems.  
I propose that small research universities use two preexisting, but 
dramatically underused, remedies as shields to adequately protect 
themselves against well-funded research universities: assignment 
agreements and liquidated damage provisions in the researcher’s 
employment contract. When the university employs researchers, the 
researchers are usually forced to sign an assignment agreement and 
an employment agreement as a precondition to employment.
10
 
Depending on the language of the assignment agreement, the 
university may retain ownership to any patents or copyrights invented 
or conceived of while employed by the university. This agreement 
disincentivizes competing universities from luring away researchers 
under the pretense of acquiring the researcher’s patents and/or 
 
grants system encouraged such growth.”); National Science Foundation, Rankings by Total 
R&D Expenditures, https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/profiles/site?method=rankingBySource&ds=herd. 
 6. See, e.g., Fikes, infra note 126 (USC encouraged Aisen away from UCSD by offering, 
among other incentives, “a $500,000 annual salary guaranteed through 2020”).  
 7. See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text; e.g., USC Siphons, supra note 2. (“USC 
said it has obtained eight of the project’s 10 main contracts after convincing sponsors that it is 
better suited to manage their clinical trials of experimental drugs and therapies for the 
neurological disorder. Those sponsors are defecting from the Alzheimer’s Disease Cooperative 
Study, or ADCS, and shifting to an institute that USC recently opened in San Diego.”) 
 8. See Fikes, infra note 126.  
 9. USC Siphons, supra note 2.  
 10. See generally Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys. Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2188, 2199 (2011).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Bullies and Beakers 295 
 
 
copyrights. The liquidated damages provision allows a university to 
receive damages when a researcher breaches the contract by leaving 
the university for a competitor.  
Part I of this Note discusses the history of legal ownership of 
employee intellectual property. More specifically, this section 
examines both the historical and current relationship between 
universities and the private sector, congressional efforts to bolster 
innovative research, and the relevant case law interpreting this 
legislation. Part II of this Note analyzes the history of employee 
ownership of intellectual property and proposes two solutions to the 
issue described in the preceding paragraph.  
I. HISTORY 
A. Legal Ownership of Employee Intellectual Property 
Generally, principles of patent law, copyright law, contract law, 
and the common law determine ownership of patents and copyrights 
within the context of an employment dispute.
11
 Patent law and 
copyright law create property rights,
12
 while contract law governs the 
allocation of these property rights.
13
 In consideration for supplying 
researchers or inventors with the physical and financial resources 
necessary for invention and other original works, employers seek 
control of employee intellectual property by requiring present or 
future assignment of rights as a prerequisite to employment.
14
 If an 
employment contract does not exist or is somehow unenforceable, the 
common law contains default ownership rules that apply to 
inventions and other works generated by employees.
15
  
 
 11. See generally Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1479–1504 (2005) (describing how property rights facilitate 
contracting).  
 12. David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal 
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 
543, 545 (1992).  
 13. See Sean O'Connor, Controlling the Means of Innovation: The Centrality of Private 
Ordering Arrangements for Innovators and Entrepreneurs, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, 
INNOVATION, AND GROWTH 274, 282 (Robert E. Litan ed., 2011). 
 14. See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–3 (1999).  
 15. Id. at 5.  
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United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
16
 decided in 1933, is 
the foundational case addressing patent ownership arising out of 
employment.
17
 According to the United States Supreme Court, if a 
government employee is hired to invent a specific invention 
succeeds, then the ownership rights to that specific invention must be 
assigned to the employer.
18
 However, if the employee is employed in 
a general field and this employee produces an invention for which the 
employee obtained a patent, the employee retains the ownership 
rights to that patent.
19
 Although Dubilier addresses ownership rights 
of the government and its employees, this case has also been applied 
to employment relationships in the private and academic sectors.
20
 
However, Dubilier generally does not govern employer-employee 
inventions because university researchers are generally not hired 
specifically to invent.
21
 As such, university researchers who obtain 
patents and have not assigned away their ownership rights retain legal 
ownership in their inventions. Dubilier’s effect was also substantially 
limited by economic and technological growth following World War 
II.  
B. The Birth of the University-Industry Research Relationship 
Following World War II, the United States experienced an 
economic surge created by a boost in production and innovation.
22
 To 
 
 16. 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933) (holding that the United States, like any other employer, 
must specifically employ the inventor to devise the specific invention to retain ownership rights 
in the invention).  
 17. Pat K. Chew, Faculty Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 259, 262 (1992) (“[i]ts principles have been consistently applied to a broad range of 
employment settings”). 
 18. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Chew, supra note 17, at 265. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. 
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011). 
 21. Id. at 302 (“While research is an important factor in hiring, tenure, and promotion 
decisions, university faculty are not required to research a specific subject or to produce any 
particular work product.”).  
 22. The Bayh-Dole Act, a Review of Patent Issues in federally Funded Research: Hearing 
on Pub. L. No. 96-517 Before the S. Comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 67 (1994) (post-war history). See generally Ashley J. 
Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93 (2004) (summarizing the 
circumstances leading to the Bayh-Dole Act); Steve L. Bertha, Intellectual Property Activities 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/24
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maintain this level of production and innovation, the United States 
turned to domestic industry and its large network of universities.
23
 
However, by the 1970s, production and innovation waned not only 
because of United States government policy mandating federal 
ownership of patents derived from federal funding,
24
 but also because 
the government lacked resources to commercialize these patents.
25
 
Due to government policy withholding exclusive patent rights from 
private industry, companies were simply unwilling to invest in 
commercializing federally funded technologies.
26
 As a result, very 
few federally funded technologies were commercialized.
27
 Congress 
attempted to remedy this problem by passing the Bayh-Dole Act.   
 
in U.S. Research Universities, 36 IDEA 513, 514 (1996). Partly in response to the success of 
scientific-military projects conducted in conjunction with U.S. universities, the federal 
government expanded funding for scientific research at American universities. Bertha, supra, at 
514. Policymakers expected that academics would publish their federally funded results in 
public scientific journals. Id. Private industry would use this publicly available information to 
develop and commercialize related products and processes. Id.  
 23. Id. at 514.  
 24. Stevens, supra note 22, at 94; The Bayh-Dole Act, a Review of Patent Issues in 
Federally Funded Research: Hearing on Pub. L. No. 96-517 Before the S. Comm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 13 (1994) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). The government offered only non-exclusive licenses 
on patented inventions to private companies who wished to commercialize the technologies. 
Hearing, supra, at 13. There was no uniform set of nonexclusive licenses because individual 
federal agencies had their own independent internal procedures and regulations, often 
conflicting with other agencies. Allen, infra note 26, at 21. Policymakers believed that granting 
exclusive rights to non-government entities would improperly divert financial benefit from 
taxpayers to organizations concerned only with profit. Hearing, supra, at 13.  
 25. 95 Cong. Rec. S15, 034 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
Research and development was not only extremely expensive, but also only amounted to an 
estimated twenty-five percent of the costs necessary for commercialization. Hearing, supra note 
24, at 17 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole). In addition, total development costs often exceeded 
federal funding by a ratio of ten to one. 95 Cong. Rec. S15, 034 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) 
(statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).  
 26. 124 Cong. Rec. 29, 118 (1978) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole); Joseph P. Allen, A 
Long, Hard Journey: From Bayh-Dole to the Federal Technology Transfer Act, TOMORROW'S 
TECH. TRANSFER, Winter 2009, at 21.  
 27. Hearing, supra note 24, at 13, 17 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh & Sen. Robert Dole) 
(noting that of the 28,000 inventions to which the federal government held title prior to 1980, 
only five percent were licensed and less than four percent were commercialized).  
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1. The Bayh-Dole Act 
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act
28
 (BDA) to 
incentivize researchers and private industry professionals to 
commercialize federally funded technologies.
29
 The BDA was 
established as a three tiered hierarchy of intellectual property rights 
stemming from these federally funded technologies.
30
 The BDA 
granted federally funded small businesses and nonprofit 
organizations (contractors) exclusive patent rights to inventions 
developed by their employees using federal funds.
31
 These 
contractors were required to share any royalties flowing from the 
invention with their employees who devised the invention.
32
 If the 
federally funded contractors elected not to retain title to the 
inventions, the BDA gave the federal government the opportunity to 
acquire title to the inventions.
33
 Lastly, if both the federally funded 
contractor and the federal government elected not to acquire title to 
the inventions, the employee who devised the invention would 
receive title.
34
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford v. Roche
35
 further 
interpreted the BDA’s assignment provision.  
 
 28. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–11 (2000)). 
 29. 124 Cong. Rec. 29, 118 (1978) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole). 
 30. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (describing contractor's 
property rights and employee-inventors' financial rights to federally funded inventions); 35 
U.S.C. § 203 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 96-517) (describing the government's “march-in 
rights” to contractor owned inventions); Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (2004). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (“Each nonprofit organization or small business firm may, within a 
reasonable time after disclosure as required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain 
title to any subject invention”); 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) 
(“The term ‘subject invention’ means any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually 
reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement.”). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C) (“[A] requirement that the contractor share royalties with the 
inventor.”). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(2)–(3). 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (“If a contractor does not elect to retain title to a subject invention 
in cases subject to this section, the federal agency may consider and after consultation with the 
contractor requests for retention of rights by the inventor subject to the provisions of this Act 
and regulations promulgated hereunder.”). 
 35. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 
(2011). 
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2. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. 
Roche Molecular Systems Inc.  
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court heard Stanford v. 
Roche, a patent dispute between a private research university and a 
private corporation.
36
 Stanford sued Roche Molecular Systems in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
alleging that Roche’s HIV testing kits infringed Stanford’s patents.37  
Around 1988, Dr. Mark Holodniy became a researcher at Stanford 
University's Department of Infectious Diseases.
38
 Upon joining 
Stanford, Holodniy signed a Copyright and Patent Agreement 
“agree[ing] to assign” Stanford his “right, title and interest in 
inventions resulting from his employment at [Stanford].”39 Soon 
after, Holodniy was sent to Cetus, a small California company, to 
learn a process critical to his HIV research.
40
 Prior to joining Cetus, 
Holodniy signed an agreement stating that he “will assign and do 
hereby assign” to Cetus his right, title, and interest in each of the 
inventions made as a consequence of his engagement with Cetus.
41
 
While at Cetus, Holodniy developed a procedure to measure the HIV 
levels in a patient’s blood.42 Holodniy returned to Stanford to further 
develop the procedure.
43
 Stanford filed and secured several patents 
resulting from Holodniy’s process.44 In 1991, Roche Molecular 
Systems acquired Cetus’s assets in Holodniy’s process, 
commercialized them, and began selling HIV testing kits 
worldwide.
45
 
The district court ruled for Stanford, holding that although 
Holodniy assigned all his rights in his inventions to Cetus, Holodniy 
never had the right to assign because under the BDA’s hierarchy of 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 782. 
 38. Id. at 781.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. During this time Stanford obtained written assignments of rights to Holodniy’s 
procedures from all employees, including Holodniy. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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rights, Stanford had paramount title.
46
 The Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court decision, holding that Holodniy's 
agreement with Stanford constituted a “mere promise to assign rights 
in the future”47 while Holodniy's agreement with Cetus automatically 
and affirmatively assigned Holodniy's interest in his inventions to 
Cetus.
48
 Thus, Cetus's rights in Holodniy's inventions trumped 
Stanford's interest, and Cetus obtained full title to the HIV testing 
patents.
49
 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment in favor of Roche, holding that The BDA does not 
automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal 
contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such 
inventions.
50
 The Court determined that the BDA applied
51
 and 
because Stanford complied with all contractor requirements of the 
BDA, Stanford was entitled to retain interest in the subject inventions 
granted by the BDA.
52
 However, the Court did not elaborate on what 
exactly these contractor rights were. Citing Dubilier,
53
 the Court 
reasoned that absent any agreement to the contrary, because inventors 
 
 46. Id. at 784; compare 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (“Each nonprofit organization or small 
business firm may, within a reasonable time after disclosure as required by paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section, elect to retain title to any subject invention”), and 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (“The term 
‘subject invention’ means any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to 
practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (“If 
a contractor does not elect to retain title to a subject invention in cases subject to this section, 
the federal agency may consider and after consultation with the contractor requests for retention 
of rights by the inventor subject to the provisions of this Act and regulations promulgated 
hereunder.”).  
 47. 563 U.S. at 784.  
 48. Id. at 784. I “assign and do[] hereby assign.” Id. at 781.  
 49. Id. at 784. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the BDA did 
not “automatically void” inventors’ rights in federally funded inventions. Id. Therefore, the 
BDA did not destroy Cetus’s patent rights acquired from Holodniy. Accordingly, Stanford 
lacked standing to sue Roche because the BDA did not void Roche’s ownership of the patents. 
Id. 
 50. Id. at 784–93.  
 51. Id. The BDA applied because federal funds from the National Institute of Health were 
used to finance the research. Id.  
 52. Id. at 782. The Court stated specifically that Stanford properly “disclosed the 
invention, conferred on the Government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, paid-up license to use 
the patented procedure, and formally notified NIH that it elected to retain title to the invention.” 
Id.  
 53. Id. at 786; Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187 (“A patent is property and title to it can pass only 
by assignment.”).  
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had the right to patent their own inventions and could assign rights to 
their inventions, employers/contractors have no rights to an invention 
that the employee alone conceived.
54
 For an employer to retain such 
rights, the inventor must specifically assign those rights to the 
employer.
55
 Reinforcing this decision was the Court’s conclusion that 
the BDA did not grant sole title of federally funded inventions to 
contractors.
56
 The Court recognized that universities regularly enter 
into assignment agreements with their employees as a precondition to 
employment.
57
 Therefore, these assignment agreements would 
preempt the BDA and would effectively transfer rights to the 
contractor or subsequently, the government.
58
 As illustrated by 
Stanford v. Roche, universities and private companies were now 
properly positioned to mutually benefit from federal funding.  
C. Private Industry on Campus 
This section examines how biotechnology companies and 
universities are particularly situated to mutually benefit from research 
arrangements and outlines how three types of university employee 
assignment agreements govern the intellectual property rights of 
 
 54. Roche, 563 U.S. at 786 (quoting Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 189). See Parker Tresemer, 
Renewing the Bayh-Dole Act as a Default Rule in the Wake of Stanford v. Roche, 6 J. LEGAL 
TECH. RISK MGMT. 173 (2012), for an in depth analysis of the legislative intent behind the 
BDA and its juxtaposition with the Roche decision.  
 55. Roche, 563 U.S. at 786 (citing Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187). 
 56. Id. at 2198–99. The Court reasoned that “[i]t would be noteworthy enough for 
Congress to” displace the foundational precepts of patent law “and deprive inventors of rights 
in their own inventions.” Id. at 792. But if Congress had intended the BDA to be “such a sea 
change” in inventor rights, “it would have said so clearly . . . .” Id. The Court remarked that the 
BDA does not expressly grant title to contractors or anyone else, nor does it explicitly withhold 
from inventors their basic interest in federally funded inventions. Id. at 787. Inventions of the 
contractor include only those actually owned by the federal contractor. Id. at 789. Because the 
BDA's provision allowing contractors to “elect to retain title to any subject invention” fails to 
vest sole title in federal contractors, without an explicit assignment transferring an employee-
inventor's rights to an employer-contractor, the contractor never has title. Id. at 790–91 (quoting 
35 U.S.C. §§ 201(e), 202(a)). The Court reasoned that the BDA only operates when an 
invention already belongs to the contractor and that the BDA's use of the word “retain” 
underscored this point. Id. at 789.  
 57. Id. at 793.  
 58. Id. The Court asserted that an effective assignment agreement uses the “do hereby 
assign” language from the Cetus agreement, not Stanford's “agree to assign” language. Id. at 
792–93. 
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researchers engaged in these cooperative public-private research 
arrangements. This section also identifies recent distributions of both 
federal and private research funds and outlines National Institute of 
Health (NIH) procedures concerning the transfer of federal research 
funds between universities following a change in the researcher’s 
employer.  
1. Biotechnology’s Special Relationship with Universities 
Private companies specializing in biotechnology and life sciences 
often benefit from relationships with universities.
59
 Biotechnology is 
one field that originated at universities.
60
 Biotechnology’s 
intrinsically scientific mode of inquiry resembles the academic nature 
of universities more so than semiconductor or computer industries, 
which tend to be more commercial and less motivated by public 
health concerns.
61
 Universities often employ experts in the field.
62
 
Due to the highly regulated nature of the industry,
63
 biotechnology 
companies frequently partner with universities in order to satisfy their 
basic research needs.
64
 Likewise, universities benefit from 
partnerships with private industry by “tapping a new source of 
 
 59. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMMERCIAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 411, 531 (1984). 
 60. See DALY, supra note 3, at 51 (“Biotechnology emerged, . . . as a direct result of 
technology transfer from the universities which originally were the only places where the 
expertise existed.”).  
 61. See David E. Korn, Patent and Trade Secret Protection in University-Industry 
Research Relationships in Biotechnology, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 195–97 (1987).  
 62. University/Industry Cooperation in Biotechnology: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of 
the House Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong. 1, 90 (1982) (statement of Rep. 
Albert Gore, Jr., Chairman of the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. 
on Sci. & Tech.).  
 63. Thomas H. Kramer, Note, Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Non-Practicing 
Entity Patent Assertion Problem: The Risks for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 39 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 467, 490 (2014); e.g., Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA 
Molecules, 51 Fed. Reg. 16958-01 (proposed May 7, 1986). 
 64. See Vertinsky supra note 3, at 1957; DALY supra note 3, at 42 (“[U]niversities cannot 
usually afford the very expensive development of biotechnology inventions.”). “By sponsoring 
biotechnological research in a university laboratory, a company can obtain access to the work of 
the best people in the field, from Nobel laureates to talented graduate students.” Korn, supra 
note 61, at 199–20. The private “sponsor also gains a potential recruiting source and the 
opportunity to train its own staff with some of the best researchers in the field.” Korn, supra 
note 61, at 200.  
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funding, improving the quality of applied science, and facilitating 
technology transfer to industry[,]” all of which help boost the 
academic reputation of the university.
65
 To maximize monetary gain 
and minimize potential intellectual property loss deriving from 
partnerships with private industry, universities retain rights to their 
employee inventions by way of assignment agreements.  
2. University Assignment Agreements 
Due to the development of the BDA, major research universities 
have frequently developed partnerships with private companies.
66
 
Universities protect their rights to these potentially lucrative 
inventions by way of assignment agreements with researchers and 
faculty.
67
 In response, universities created Technology Licensing 
Offices to manage these assignment agreements, ensure regulatory 
compliance, and facilitate technology transfers between the university 
and private partners.
68
 Universities generally structure their 
assignment agreements to fit one of three different approaches: the 
Resource-Provider approach,
69
 the Maximalist approach,
70
 and the 
 
 65. Korn, supra note 61, at 201 (“[r]esearchers with industrial support are more 
productive, having higher publication rates and creating more patent applications” (citing 
Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology: Implications 
for the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361, 1363 (1986)). “More importantly, cooperation brings 
together scientists who otherwise would be prevented from working together,” which can 
further clarify or enhance “the research directions and emphasis of the university scientist.” 
Korn, supra note 61, at 201. 
 66. See generally supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  
 67. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933); supra notes 
16–20 and accompanying text.  
 68. See Vertinsky supra note 3, at 1967.  
 69. Chew, supra note 17, at 276. The “resource-provider” approach rooted in the 
university’s contribution to the invention's development. Id. at 276–77. In this approach, 
“universities claim ownership of faculty-generated research and inventions only if faculty have 
made significant use of university resources.” Id. at 276. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE 
OF TECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO THE OWNERSHIP, DISTRIBUTION AND COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF M.I.T. TECHNOLOGY 1 (2014) (“MIT owns Intellectual Property made or 
created by MIT faculty, students, staff or others participating in research pursuant to a 
sponsored research agreement to which MIT is a party . . . ownership of Intellectual Property 
developed by faculty . . . participating in MIT programs, including visitors, with the significant 
use of funds or facilities administered by MIT will vest with MIT”). 
 70. The “maximalist” approach is generally the most common method found in 
assignment agreements and it maximizes the university’s rights to employee inventions. Chew, 
supra note 17, at 277–78. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific 
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Supra-Maximalist approach.
71
 In addition to private funds, federal 
funds are also available for universities.  
3. Federal Funding and the Federal Grant Process 
For the fiscal years of 2015 through 2016, the government 
estimates that federal funding of non-defense-related research and 
development will be $66.6 billion and $70.3 billion, respectively.
72
 
Within these figures, the NIH will receive an estimated $29 billion.
73
 
A large portion of these funds is distributed as federal grants to fund 
university research.
74
  
 
Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989) (describing issues and problems regarding computer software). 
“[T]he university claim[s] ownership to two classes of inventions: all those resulting from: (1) 
the course of the faculty’s employment, and (2) the faculty’s use of university’s resources.” 
Chew, supra note 17, at 277–78. See, for example, the Yale University patent policy which 
states that:  
An invention made by a faculty member in the course of a paid consulting engagement 
for a company may be assigned to the company only if it is unrelated to the activities 
for which the faculty member is employed by Yale and it was not made or conceived 
under circumstances involving University facilities or personnel. . . It will be 
considered not to have involved the use of University facilities if no University 
facilities or resources . . . no University-administered funds, and no University 
personnel other than the faculty member himself or herself, are involved in the 
conception or reduction to practice of the invention. 
YALE UNIVERSITY, YALE UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICY (2014) . 
 71. “The ‘supra-maximalist’ approach provides that the university claims ownership of 
inventions and resulting patent rights from all faculty activities, including those developed 
outside the scope of employment.” Chew, supra note 17, at 280. For example, the University of 
California has an Oath of Allegiance, Patent Policy, and Acknowledgement that conforms to 
this approach:  
I acknowledge my obligation to assign, and do hereby assign, inventions and patents 
that I conceive or develop 1) within the course and scope of my University 
employment . . . 2) during the course of my utilization of any University research 
facilities, or 3) through any connection with my use of gift, grant, or contract research 
funds received through the University. 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA STATE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE, 
PATENT POLICY, AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT (revised ed. 1997).  
 72. Historical Trends in Federal R&D, AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT SCI., DEF., 
NONDEFENSE, & TOTAL, http://www.aaas.org/page/historical-trends-federal-rd (last updated 
June, 2016). 
 73. Id.  
 74. For the fiscal year 2015, 83% of NIH funds totaling approximately $24.96 billion was 
distributed to extramural research programs. From Tabular Data, President's Budget Request, at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/24
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When a university seeks federal funding, they must comply with 
the BDA and the regulations of the administrative organization, 
which grants the federal funds (generally the Public Health Service 
distributing funds to its constituent organizations).
75
 Government 
agencies have created extensive policies addressing conflicts of 
interest between researchers employed at universities and their 
relationships with private companies.
76
 Moreover, the NIH has 
created policies addressing situations when researchers want to move 
to another institution.
77
 Should a university researcher seek to move 
to a different institution and transfer their federally funded program, 
NIH policy requires that the researcher notify the NIH and seek their 
approval to transfer the grant of federal funds because the 
employee/researcher’s previous employer still has the right to the 
federal grant.
78
 In addition to federal funding, private funding is also 
available for university research.  
4. Funding from Private Industry 
The role of private industry in funding university research and 
development in science has grown considerably in recent years.
79
 In 
2013, private industry spent $3.5 billion in university research and 
development.
80
 Although government funding remains the major 
 
3, 18, 22, http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfs/FY16/Overview%20(Volume%20I).pdf. Johns 
Hopkins University, the University of California San Francisco, the University of Michigan, 
and the University of Pennsylvania received approximately $584.7 million, $560.4 million, 
$453.4 million, and $453.4 million, respectively in NIH research funding in 2015. Research 
Portfolio Online Reporting Tools, NIH Awards by Location & Organization, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://report.nih.gov/award/index.cfm (last updated Jan. 9, 2017).  
 75. Claire Turcotte Maatz, Comment, University Physician-Researcher Conflicts of 
Interest: The Inadequacy of Current Controls and Proposed Reform, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 137, 
167 n.169 (1991/92). 
 76. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (“Each institution shall: (a) Maintain an up-to-date, written, 
enforced policy on financial conflicts of interest that complies with this subpart”). 
 77. National Institute of Health, Thinking of Moving: A Guide for Transferring an NIH 
Grant to a New Institution (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.niams.nih.gov/funding/Policies_ 
and_Guidelines/transfer_institution.pdf. 
 78. Id. (“The grant belongs to the grantee institution and they have the right to either 
relinquish it or to keep it and name a new PI.”). 
 79. National Science Foundation, Higher Education R&D Expenditures, by Source of 
Funds and R&D Field: FYs 1953–2013, http://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/herd/2013/html/HERD2013_ 
DST_01.html. 
 80. Id.  
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source of funding for universities, the decline in federal funding over 
the past decade has resulted in universities looking to private industry 
to make up the difference.
81
 
D. The Regents of the University of California v. Aisen 
In 2015, the Regents of the University of California (Regents) 
commenced a lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court against Paul 
Aisen, a prominent Alzheimer’s researcher and former director of the 
Alzheimer’s Disease Cooperative Study (ADCS) based at the 
University of California San Diego (UCSD), other formerly affiliated 
researchers, and their new employer, the University of Southern 
California (USC).
82
  
ADCS is a research program designed to speed up access to 
Alzheimer’s treatments for patients.83 The NIH, pharmaceutical 
companies, and private donors fund the ADCS.
84
 In 2013, NIH 
announced that the ADCS received a five-year, $55 million federal 
grant.
85
 Total funding of the ADCS was nearly $100 million.
86
 Aisen 
resigned from UCSD and the ADCS program on June 21, 2015 and 
was subsequently hired by USC to lead its new research center in San 
Diego.
87
 UCSD did not allow Aisen to transfer the ADCS grant 
money or retain access to the data.
88
 Following Aisen’s departure 
 
 81. Art Iahnke, Who Picks up the Tab for Science?, BU TODAY (Apr. 26, 2015), 
http://www.bu.edu/today/2015/funding-for-scientific-research/.  
[A]t Harvard, university data show a clear shift toward corporate and foundation 
funding. There, 75 percent of research is paid for by the government, corporate 
research funding has tripled, to $41 million, from 2006 to 2013, and foundation 
support has increased 50 percent, to $115 million. Harvard is now helping researchers 
set up meetings with big donors. 
Id. 
 82. Compl., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Aisen, No. 37-2015-00022082 (San Diego 
Super. Ct. July 2, 2015). 
 83. USC Siphons, supra note 2. 
 84. Bruce V. Bigelow, USC Makes Federal Case Out of Dispute Over Alzheimer’s Study, 
XCONOMY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.xconomy.com/san-diego/2015/08/19/usc-makes-
federal-case-out-of-dispute-over-alzheimers-study/. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. See Compl. for Money Damages and Equitable Relief at 7, Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Aisen, No. 37-2015-00022082 (San Diego Super. Ct. July 2, 2015).  
 88. Id. at 9–10.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/24
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from UCSD and ADCS, UCSD made a failed attempt to access the 
ADCS data, which was secured on a third party server.
89
 According 
to the third party server, the account was no longer “owned” by 
UCSD.
90
 According to the NIH representatives, UCSD continued to 
hold the ADCS grant and custody of the data.
91
  
The Regents brought seven causes of action including breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of duty of loyalty by employee, interference 
with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, 
conversion, commission of computer crimes, and civil conspiracy 
against Aisen.
92
 The court granted UCSD’s request for a preliminary 
injunction to preserve UCSD’s control over the Alzheimer’s research 
data pending the results of the litigation.
93
 Following this preliminary 
injunction, USC secured eight of the ten main ADCS contracts, 
including pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly’s A4 clinical trial—worth an 
estimated $76 million—after convincing donors/sponsors that USC 
was better suited for managing the clinical trials of experimental 
drugs.
94
 Since this injunction, USC successfully removed the action 
to federal court by alleging federal question jurisdiction regarding the 
copyright ownership of the database featured in the Regents’ 
complaint.
95
   
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 10.  
 91. Id. at 9.  
 92. Id. Aisen and USC countersued alleging violation of the California Constitution, 
violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defamation, tortious interference with 
existing patient relations, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage. Cross-cl. of Defs. Aisen & Univ. of S. Cal., at 1, Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Aisen, No. 37-2015-00022082 (San Diego Super. Ct. July 31, 2015).  
 93. Preliminary Inj. & Appointment of Special Master at 1, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Aisen, No. 37-2015-00022082 (San Diego Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015).  
 94. USC Siphons, supra note 2; Bradley J. Fikes & Gary Robbins, Lilly Yanks Millions 
from UCSD for Alzheimer's Study, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/aug/04/UCSD-Lilly-grants/.  
 95. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Aisen, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1060 (S.D. Cal. 2015).  
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II. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL 
A. Analysis 
1. United States v. Dubilier and Stanford v. Roche 
Dubilier provides the default rule determining ownership of 
intellectual property absent a valid employment contract controlling 
the issue.
96
 Ownership turns on whether or not the employee is hired 
to make a specific invention.
97
 If the employee is employed in a 
general field, produces an invention, and the employee obtains a 
patent for this invention, then the employee retains ownership.
98
 The 
default rule established the general notion that an employee hired to 
work in a general field has ownership of his/her work product if they 
obtain a patent or copyright on that discovery.
99
 Employment 
agreements that assign an employee’s property rights to the employer 
serve as an exception to the rule.
100
 
Relying on principles from Dubilier, the Supreme Court correctly 
determined that the BDA governed the relationship between Stanford 
University and the NIH because this relationship was federally 
funded.
101
 Holodniy’s research agreement with Cetus and his 
employment agreement with Stanford University contained language 
assigning intellectual property rights.
102
 In reaching its holding in 
favor of Roche, the Court correctly interpreted the language of the 
Holodniy-Stanford employment agreement as an insufficient promise 
to assign as opposed to an actual assignment of ownership.
103
 Most 
importantly, this decision laid out the framework for a sufficient 
assignment agreement and further reinforced Dubilier notions that, 
 
 96. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187. 
 97. Id. (noting that if a government employee hired to invent a specific invention 
succeeds, then the ownership rights to that specific invention must be assigned to the 
employer).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (“A patent is property and title to it can pass only by assignment.”). 
 101. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys. Inc., 563 U.S. 
776, 782 (2011). 
 102. Id. at 782–84. 
 103. Id. at 787–88. 
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barring an effective assignment agreement, inventors retain title to 
their federally funded inventions.
104
 As illustrated in this case, a 
public-private partnership between Stanford and Roche resulted in 
patent commercialization as intended in the BDA.  
2. The BDA and the Growth of Private Industry on Campus 
The main purpose of the BDA is to encourage collaboration 
between the federal government, nonprofit institutions, and the 
private sector in order to increase the number of commercialized 
patents available to the public.
105
 While the BDA is considered a 
rousing success,
106
 it has also unintentionally incentivized cutthroat 
competition in certain fields that demand steadfast cooperation, 
namely the health sciences and biotechnology. 
Some scholars argue that a strong focus on research topics that are 
likely to generate patentable inventions is contrary to the central 
mission of academia, which is to conduct basic research to ultimately 
lay the foundation for future advanced research.
107
 These scholars 
 
 104. Id. at 793.  
 105. The BDA states the following policy and objective:  
[T]o use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from 
federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum participation of 
small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to 
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, 
including universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and 
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise 
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the 
commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United States by 
United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient 
rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and 
protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize 
the costs of administering policies in this area.  
35 U.S.C. §200 (2006).  
 106. Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/1476653. Bayh-Dole: 30 Years of Driven Innovation, MY DESIRING-MACHINES (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://mydesiringmachines.wordpress.com/2013/01/16/bayh-dole-30-years-of-driven-
innovation/. 
 107. Robert M. Yeh, The Public Paid for the Invention: Who Owns It?, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 453, 466 (2012). They argue that:  
[T]he goal of basic research is not necessarily to endow the public with a new patent 
on a specific invention, or for the government to generate some nominal royalties from 
out-licensing a specific invention and offset the burden of supporting basic research in 
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argue that the main purpose of publicly funded research is to increase 
overall long term social welfare.
108
 These long-term benefits arise 
from a collective broadening of scientific inquiry.
109
 Therefore, an 
invention, patent, or copyright is merely one of many steps necessary 
for any scientific breakthrough to benefit the public.
110
 
Basic scientific research serves as the foundation of innovative 
applied research and development.
111
 In comparison to the goal of the 
BDA,
112
 federally funded basic research seeks to advance scientific 
knowledge and train new generations of scientists and engineers.
113
 
As it stands now, private industry is generally uninterested in funding 
basic scientific research.
114
 Likewise, within the linear model of 
innovation, universities are “expected to forge relationships with 
industry as a way of moving public research results into the hands of 
private developers[,]” instead of providing the commercially viable 
innovations freely to the public.
115
 Universities often take ownership 
of commercially viable intellectual property from employee-
inventors, patent or copyright them, and then market them to private 
entities for further development.
116
 
 
the first place. Nor is the goal of publicly funded research to give contractors a new 
lucrative revenue stream with the licensing of blockbuster patents.  
Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 467. 
 111. Carol Mimura, Nuance Management of IP Rights: Shaping Industry-University 
Relationships to Promote Social Impact, WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 269, 269–73 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010). 
 112. See generally 95 CONG. REC. S15,034 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (statement of Sen. 
Robert Dole). Congress passed the BDA to incentivize researchers and private industry 
professionals to commercialize federally funded technologies and spur innovation. Id.  
 113. See, e.g., Congress's stated various purposes for the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) in the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, 42 U.S.C. §1862 (2002).  
 114. See Vertinsky supra note 3, at 1956–57. 
 115. Vertinsky supra note 3, at 1960; e.g., Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on 
Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 453 (1997) (“the biggest source of licensing royalties at both Stanford and the 
University of California arise from the famous Cohen-Boyer patents”). 
 116. See, e.g., Vertinsky, supra note 3, at 1957–68 (describing a linear model of 
innovation); Mimura, supra note 111, at 269–71. (“Universities, however, perform early-stage 
research and serve to accelerate innovation; they are lead-off runners in a multi-party relay race 
to commercial endpoints . . . Cutting edge academic research laboratories typically create early 
stage, ‘embryonic’ technologies that are far from being actual commercial products.”). 
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Over the past few years, federal funding of basic scientific 
research has declined.
117
 In order to adequately fund both basic and 
innovative research, universities have proactively forged 
relationships with wealthy benefactors and private companies.
118
 For 
example, institutions such as Harvard University, Stanford 
University, and the University of Southern California have combined 
to raise over $2.8 billion in 2014.
119
  
These newfound relationships with private benefactors and 
companies appear to be a win-win situation for universities: they 
acquire more funding for basic and innovative scientific research, 
which could eventually lead to scientific breakthroughs that have 
substantial commercial value. The goal of the university is the pursuit 
of knowledge that will benefit its students, faculty, and more 
importantly, the public welfare.
120
 Exploiting lucrative patent and 
copyright royalties is merely a secondary goal of universities.
121
 In 
comparison, the primary goal of private companies who enter into 
partnerships with universities is to obtain patents and copyrights that 
can be marketed and sold to the public.
122
 This cooperative 
 
 117. Art Jahnke, Who Picks up the Tab for Science?, BU TODAY, http://www.bu.edu/ 
today/2015/funding-for-scientific-research/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 118. See Alvin Powell, Harvard Kicks Off Fundraising Effort, HARV. GAZETTE (Sept. 13, 
2013), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/09/harvard-kicks-off-fundraising-effort/; 
Stanford Concludes Transformative Campaign, STAN. REP. (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/february/stanford-challenge-concludes-020812.html; The 
Campaign for the University of Southern California, CAMPAIGN, https://campaign.usc.edu/ (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 119. Kaitlin Mulhere, Deep-Pocket Donors, INSIDE HIGHER ED., https://www.inside 
highered.com/news/2015/01/28/2014-record-year-higher-ed-donations (last visited Nov. 10, 
2016).  
Charitable donations to colleges reached an all-time high of nearly $38 billion last 
year, according to an annual survey released today by the Council for Aid to 
Education. Donors increased the amount they gave colleges in 2014 by 10.8 percent, 
up from $33.8 billion in 2013, which was the previous historic high. Without adjusting 
for inflation, the growth between 2013 and 2014 was the largest since 2000. Gifts from 
all sources, including alumni, corporations and foundations, were up in 2014, although 
each source’s proportion of the total was roughly the same as it was in 2013.  
Id.  
 120. See Yeh, supra note 107, at 466. 
 121. Id.  
 122. See Hearing, supra note 24, at 13.  
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partnership between universities and private industry is exactly what 
the BDA was intended to facilitate.
123
  
The BDA indirectly and unpredictably disincentivized innovative 
university research among smaller institutions because they do not 
have the resources to develop and retain their faculty driven research 
programs. Universities and private companies are not only competing 
against other entities within their respective fields, but are competing 
against each other for funding, prestige, and commercial 
innovation.
124
 Though competition is generally considered an 
incentive to research, unfettered competition among universities for 
funding and prestige has led to particularized instances that appear to 
disincentivize university innovative research.
125
 This nuanced 
disincentive flows from a widely held, yet deeply flawed, university 
employment practice.  
It is a general practice among universities to allow other 
universities to recruit and hire their researchers/faculty.
126
 Oftentimes 
these researchers/faculty bring with them any private funding they 
may be receiving that facilitates their research.
127
 Larger and more 
established research universities generally possess greater prestige 
and fundraising ability.
128
 This allows well-funded research 
universities to raid faculty/researchers from smaller research 
 
 123. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). (stating that the BDA was intended “to promote collaboration 
between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to 
promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and 
discovery”).  
 124. See Mulhere, supra note 119; Larry Gordon, In Quest to Raise $6 Billion, USC Runs a 
Massive Fundraising Machine, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/ 
education/la-me-usc-fundraising-20150621-story.html.  
 125. E.g., Aisen, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1055 (Although this disincentive is not addressed by the 
court, this case presents a fact pattern where a university is not compensated for losing valuable 
research personnel and their programs).  
 126. See generally Bradley J. Fikes, UCSD Sues USC, Noted Alzheimer's Researcher, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 2, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/jul/02/ 
ucsd-sues-usc-aisen/.  
 127. See USC Siphons, supra note 2. Public funding is governed by the particular federal 
agency that distributes the money. As such, federal agencies control whether or not a university 
professor/researcher can bring public funding to another institution. See supra note 77 and 
accompanying text.  
 128. See National Science Foundation, Rankings by Total R&D Expenditures, NAT’L SCI. 
FOUND., https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/profiles/site?method=rankingBySource&ds=herd (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2016). 
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universities with impunity. In exchange for an increase in salary and 
other intangible benefits, well-funded research universities obtain 
innovative researchers as well as their projects, and occasionally, 
their private sources of funding.
129
 On the other hand, small research 
universities who have their faculty and their projects raided often 
receive nothing in return for the initial development of faculty 
research.
130
 This has led to a consolidation of innovative research 
among well-financed research universities.
131
 Most importantly, this 
disincentivizes smaller research universities from engaging in 
innovative scientific research because they could potentially lose 
crucial faculty researchers, their programs, and their research 
funding.
132
   
Research universities should be seeking cures and remedies for 
diseases and other public health problems. While public-private 
partnerships, facilitated by the BDA, ultimately seek a cure, the 
ongoing war among research universities for prestige and funding 
disincentivizes smaller research universities from contributing to a 
cure.
133
 As such, there must be an incentive for smaller research 
universities to enter into competition with well-funded universities so 
as to pursue innovation.  
3. Regents of the University of California v. Aisen 
Aisen presented the court with facts indicating that a well-funded 
university (USC) is raiding another university (UCSD) for its 
researchers, research programs, and funding. USC is a well-funded 
research university attempting to acquire UCSD’s primary 
Alzheimer’s researchers and the funds associated with their ongoing 
research.
134
 However, in contrast to the more prestigious university 
 
 129. See Fikes, supra note 126. See also USC Siphons, supra note 2.  
 130. USC Siphons, supra note 2.  
 131. See National Science Foundation, supra note 128.  
 132. See, e.g., Compl. for Money Damages and Equitable Relief at 1, Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Aisen, No. 37-2015-00022082 (San Diego Super. Ct. July 2, 2015) (indicating that 
UCSD lost valuable research data and personnel without compensation). Fikes & Robbins, 
supra note 94 and accompanying text (UCSD lost eight of ten ADCS contracts worth an 
estimated $76 million).  
 133. See notes 124–130 and accompanying text. 
 134. Fikes, supra note 126 (“USC encouraged Aisen by granting him generous terms, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 53:293 
 
 
acquiring researchers and programs from the less prestigious 
university, USC is generally considered to be an inferior scientific 
research university when compared to UCSD.
135
 USC has engaged in 
a comprehensive fundraising campaign to expand its national brand 
and bolster its national prestige as a major research university.
136
 
USC’s acquisition of a large portion of the ADCS represents a major 
coup in boosting its research pedigree.
137
 While UCSD’s ADCS 
research uses federal funding, a large portion of the research is 
funded by a partnership with Eli Lilly.
138
 The primary question to be 
answered by this case is who owns the ownership rights to the data 
generated from ADCS’ ongoing clinical research?139 Like Stanford v. 
Roche, this case will likely turn on the validity of Aisen’s 
assignment/employment agreement and whether UCSD or Aisen has 
a valid copyright to the research database.  
B. Proposal 
Aisen represents a potentially groundbreaking opportunity for the 
court to comment on the state of public-private partnerships and the 
policies that incentivize detrimental competition among universities 
supposedly seeking to promote the public welfare through scientific 
 
including a $500,000 annual salary guaranteed through 2020 . . . USC is famous for its prowess 
in fund-raising. It has raised more than $4 billion in its $6 billion capital campaign.”).  
 135. UCSD received $390 million in National Institutes of Health funding last year, 
compared with USC's $180 million. Larry Gordon, Gary Robbins & Bradley J. Fikes, What's 
Behind UCSD, USC Court Battle?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 19, 2015), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/jul/19/usc-ucsd-alzheimers-paul-aisen-court-
legal/. US News & World Report ranked the UC San Diego medical school seventeenth in the 
nation for research while USC is in a three-way tie for thirty-first. Id.  
 136. Gordon, supra note 124. “The three-day, three-city Trojan sprint through Texas was 
underway, one that could help USC raise the $1.8 billion it needs to reach its ambitious $6-
billion campaign goal for scholarships, faculty hiring and building by the end of 2018.” Id.  
 137. USC Siphons, supra note 2 (“[ADCS] is one of the nation’s most significant and high-
profile clinical research programs for the disease.”).  
 138. Fikes & Robbins, supra note 94 (“Lilly said that it would give UC San Diego up to 
$76 million for the A4 study”). Eli Lilly is a global pharmaceutical corporation headquartered 
in Indianapolis, Indiana. ELI LILLY, https://www.lilly.com/key-facts-1 (last visited Dec. 16, 
2016). 
 139. Aisen, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1060 (“Plaintiff's claims for relief and its formal arguments 
allege its own ownership of data and software. The accuracy of the claims necessitate resort to 
federal copyright law and perhaps federal regulation of National Institute of Health research 
contracts.”).  
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innovation. Even though a remarkable opportunity was presented to 
the court, I doubt that the court would go so far as to hold for UCSD 
solely on public policy grounds since the industry norm allows 
researchers to switch universities with impunity and Aisen’s Supra-
Maximalist assignment agreement with UCSD. Looking forward 
however, I propose two potential solutions that small research 
universities may take advantage of to protect their research interests: 
creating and enforcing binding assignment agreements and 
stipulating liquidated damages provisions in the employment 
contract. 
1. Create and Enforce a Binding Assignment Agreement  
In order to best protect its long-term research programs, I 
recommend that smaller research universities institute and enforce 
mandatory employer/researcher assignment agreements. The 
language for this assignment agreement is set forth in the Roche 
decision.
140
 The assignment agreement should contain the following 
language: “I assign and do hereby assign.”141 Additionally, 
universities should strongly consider implementing the Maximalist 
approach to assignment provisions.
142
 The Maximalist approach 
provides stronger protection than the resource provider approach 
without the severity of the Supra-Maximalist approach,
143
 which 
discourages potential researchers from signing the assignment 
agreement in the first place. 
 
 140. Roche, 131 S. Ct. at 2191.  
 141. See, e.g., id. at 2202 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 142. See Chew, supra note 17, at 277–78 (defining the Maximalist approach).  
 143. Compare Yale University, Yale University Patent Policy (2014) (“All inventions 
made or conceived . . . . involving University facilities or personnel are the property of the 
University. An invention made by a faculty member in the course of a paid consulting 
engagement for a company may be assigned to the company only if it is unrelated to the 
activities for which the faculty member is employed by Yale and it was not made or conceived 
under circumstances involving University facilities or personnel”) with University of California, 
University of California State Oath of Allegiance, Patent Policy, and Acknowledgment (revised 
ed.1997) (“I acknowledge my obligation to assign, and do hereby assign, inventions and patents 
that I conceive or develop 1) within the course and scope of my University employment while 
employed by University, 2) during the course of my utilization of any University research 
facilities, or 3) through any connection with my use of gift, grant, or contract research funds 
received through the University.”). 
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Moreover, it is insufficient to force an employee to sign an 
assignment agreement without enforcing it. Because Maximalist 
assignment agreements are already commonplace among research 
universities,
144
 simply enforcing them would be the easiest solution to 
this problem. However, this problem cannot be completely solved 
with an enforced assignment agreement because the university would 
still lose the faculty member desiring to leave. 
2. Stipulate an Adequate Liquidated Damages Provision in the 
Employment Contract 
A liquidated damages provision will be held unenforceable if it is 
deemed to be a penalty.
145
 This determination is guided by principles 
of contract law.
146
 The courts consider two factors when evaluating if 
a liquidated damages provision constitutes a penalty: the damages 
must approximate the actual injury suffered by the non-breaching 
party and the damages must be reasonably uncertain at the time of 
contracting.
147
 
A liquidated damages provision would adequately compensate 
universities whose researchers are lured by other competing entities 
and would likely be enforceable in court. It would allow the 
university to retain all intellectual property generated by employees 
and would also compensate the university for the loss of one of its 
faculty members. If the liquidated damages provision is not 
 
 144. See Chew, supra note 17, at 277.  
 145. Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751 (6th. Cir. 1999) (“The term ‘liquidated 
damages’ refers to an amount determined by the parties to be just compensation for damages 
should a breach occur. Courts will not enforce such a provision, however, if the stipulated 
amount constitutes a penalty”).  
 146. See McCormick, Damages §§ 146–157, at 605–06 (1985); The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts provides:  
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an 
amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach 
and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated 
damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §356 (1981). 
 147. DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 755 (“In Tennessee, a provision will be considered one for 
liquidated damages, rather than a penalty, if it is reasonable in relation to the anticipated 
damages for breach, measured prospectively at the time the contract was entered into, and not 
grossly disproportionate to the actual damages”).  
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considered a penalty, it would likely be considered enforceable 
because it is factually analogous to liquidated damages provisions 
featured in collegiate coaching contracts.
148
 For example, reasoning 
that the university wanted stability and that the university would 
suffer damages beyond the cost of hiring a replacement coach, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a liquidated damages 
provision is enforceable.
149
 Because researchers bring with them their 
work and often their sources of funding, this collegiate coaching 
example is similar to a researcher leaving a university for a 
competitor.
150
 Like a collegiate coach, replacing a researcher can be 
especially difficult if the researcher is a noted expert in the field 
and/or they lead a university research program. Researchers also 
bring with them certain intangible assets such as reputation and 
expertise that cannot be easily quantified.  
One major problem with a liquidated damages provision is 
quantifying a reasonable estimate of damages for intangible attributes 
such as stability and reputation. A possible solution to this problem is 
to calculate the remaining value of the researcher’s employment 
contract and factor in the value of the researcher’s projects and 
funding received. The value of liquidated damages provision should 
compensate the university for some of the potential losses resulting 
from the researcher leaving for a competing university. If the 
competing university really desires that particular researcher then 
they can buy out the researcher by paying the liquidated damages 
provision. This provision would serve as a deterrent for competing 
universities to acquire other researchers but wouldn’t be an 
insurmountable impediment so long as the liquidated damages 
provision is reasonable and therefore enforceable in court. The 
university receiving these damages could potentially use this money 
to hire a substitute researcher.  
 
 148. See generally id. at 751; Kent State Univ. v. Ford, 26 N.E.3d 868, 874 (Ohio App. 11 
Dist. 2015).  
 149. DiNardo, 174 F. 3d at 756 (“[T]he parties understood that Vanderbilt university would 
suffer damage should the coach terminate his contract, and that these actual damages would be 
difficult to measure”). 
 150. See generally Aisen, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1055.  
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CONCLUSION 
Implementing solutions by way of pre-existing contracts serves as 
the best and most reasonable method of evening out the playing field 
among competing research universities. Creating and enforcing 
assignment agreements allows universities to retain ownership of 
patents and copyrights that researchers discover while employed.
151
 
This serves as a mild deterrent discouraging competing research 
universities from raiding each other’s faculty researchers for the sole 
purpose of acquiring valuable patents and copyrights. The stronger 
deterrent focuses on introducing liquidated damages provisions in 
researcher employment contracts. Even though this solution presents 
several issues, they can be remedied by evaluating salary, private and 
public grant funding, and certain intangibles such as reputation and 
stability. Liquidated damages allow a university to not only shield 
itself from possible raiders, it also allows universities to fund suitable 
replacement researchers that would serve as capable program leaders.  
Due to the BDA’s goal of fostering cooperation between 
universities and the private sector to generate commercial patents,
152
 
business factors such as lucrative patent and copyright royalties have 
crept into university decision-making,
153
 thus rendering universities 
significant players in the business of science.
154
 Since the enactment 
of the BDA, the seemingly distinct goals of universities and private 
sector companies have merged, intertwining both the goals of a cure 
and allure of massive profits.
155
 Though both universities and private 
companies endeavor to create innovative research, the underlying 
search for a cure is much more valuable than any potential royalty 
generated from this innovative research. Each day a university is 
delayed from beginning innovative research could potentially result 
in lives lost. Small research institutions need to take full advantage of 
preexisting contractual remedies to adequately protect themselves 
from large research universities poaching their valuable researchers, 
programs, and funding. 
 
 151. See generally United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).  
 152. See 35 U.S.C. § 200; supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
 153. See Dueker, supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 154. See 35 U.S.C. § 200; supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Yeh, supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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